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Introduction 
The question of what emotions are is the most fundamental issue in the philosophy of emotion. In 
answering this question in different ways we get diverging theories of emotion. Julien Deonna and 
Fabrice Teroni have proposed a new theory, the attitudinal theory, which tells us what emotions are. 
Broadly, the view is that emotions are evaluative attitudes, such that different emotion types are 
distinct evaluative attitudes. More specifically, emotions are evaluative attitudes towards 
intentional contents provided by other mental states – their cognitive bases, such as judgements, 
imaginations, and perceptions. In contrast to Evaluativist views (e.g., Judgementalism and 
Perceptualism), the relevant contents are claimed to be non-evaluative; thick evaluative properties 
like the disgusting, dangerous, terrifying, humorous, and admirable – which are connected to the 
individuation and intelligibility of emotions – are not part of the content of emotional experience. 
Although, the relevant emotion is correct iff the object provided by the cognitive base exemplifies 
the relevant evaluative property. As such emotional experiences, as felt evaluative attitudes, stand 
in intentional relations to values without being about values.1  
This paper critically assesses a substantive development of the attitudinal theory, which I call 
the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion, as expressed in the claim that emotions, as evaluative 
attitudes, are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness.2 The critical reception of the attitudinal theory has 
 
1 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: Ch.7; 2014: 25-9; 2015: 293-311; 2017 55-63; forthcoming: 1-23. Deonna and 
Teroni commit to the strong supervenience of values: the cognitive base presents non-evaluative properties 
that jointly constitute the relevant evaluative property. 
2 Aside from Deonna and Teroni, approximations of this view are held by Claparède 1928: 124-139; Slaby 
2008: 429-44; Colombetti 2011: 293-313; Scarantino: 2014: 155-185.  
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centred around its claims, documented above, concerning the content of emotional experience 
and the associated epistemology of value and emotion.3 Comparatively less has been said about 
how the theory is developed in terms of felt bodily attitudes of action readiness – which will be 
my focus here (as such this paper does not primarily concern the former issues or alternative non-
bodily formulations of the view).  
Let me briefly say something about the motivation for focusing on the Attitudinal view so 
thoroughly. First, Attitudinalism has emerged as the main contemporary competitor to 
Perceptualism and Judgementalism, and so a thorough critical evaluation of it is central to a proper 
understanding of (a) the direction of travel in emotion theory over the last decade, (b) the standing 
of the current theories on offer, and (c) potential avenues for further research. Connected to this, 
Attitudinalism (as noted above) bucks the trend of various stripes of Evaluativism insofar as it 
does not place values at the level of content. More specifically, the idea that emotions are 
distinctive felt bodily attitudes of action readiness promises to reframe the way in which emotions are 
evaluative experiences, and so an assessment of the theory is crucial to the project of understanding 
the connection between emotions and value (a central theme in contemporary philosophy of 
emotion). Finally, the bodily-attitudinal theory, as we shall see, promises to incorporate a number 
of critical points of agreement in the philosophy of emotion concerning the intentionality of 
emotion, while preserving the Jamesian idea that the body (more specifically bodily 
phenomenology) is central to a correct understanding of emotions. Given this, it is of paramount 
importance to provide an assessment of the extent to which this theory manages to successfully 
reconcile the intentionality of emotion with the (supposed) centrality of bodily feelings in 
emotional experience.  
 
3 See Smith 2014: 102-6; Dokic and Lemaire 2015: 271-92; Müller 2017: 281-308; Rossi and Tappolet 2018: 
113-83. 
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The discussion proceeds as follows. After offering a reconstruction of the view (section 1), 
two objections are considered (section 2). These are the ‘absence of bodily phenomenology’, and 
‘what kind of awareness’ objections, which relate to the views’ reliance on bodily-phenomenology 
and the positing of a distinctive kind of non-intentional awareness. Finally, section 3 focuses on 
felt action readiness and suggests an ‘object-side’ interpretation, which contrasts with that provided 
by the bodily-attitudinal theory. This ‘object-side’ interpretation also serves as a positive proposal 
for how we can theorize about the phenomenology of action-readiness in emotional experience in 
a way that is not tied to the bodily-attitudinal theory. 
The overall claim of this paper is that while the bodily-attitudinal theory is a distinctive 
proposal concerning the question of what emotions are, there remain significant issues which need 
addressing. Defenders of the view should, therefore, meet the challenges set out here if they wish 
to preserve the theory. 
 
1. Felt Bodily Attitudes   
1.1 Clarifying the attitudes 
To better understand the attitudinal theory, we can make some clarifications concerning 
psychological attitudes. The attitudes in question are intentional attitudes, such that they are about 
something or directed toward something. Familiar candidates are propositional attitudes like belief, 
desire, supposition, wonder, hope, conjecture, and judgement. In these cases, the attitudes take the relevant 
propositions as objects or are directed toward (or perhaps related to) propositional contents, 
specified in terms of the objects under aspects, say as having relevant properties (e.g. the belief 
that the sun is 73% helium). However, the class of intentional attitudes is not exhausted by 
propositional attitudes. There are also non-propositional attitudes, such as perception, visual 
imagination, and episodic memory. 
 The attitudinal theory holds that emotions get their intentional content from the psychological 
states on which they are based – their cognitive bases – and so inherit their (non)propositional 
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content. So, for the sake of simplicity, and bypassing questions concerning the (propositional or 
not) structure of the relevant basing contents, we can talk of the relevant emotional attitudes as 
attitudes towards objects (and their properties). We can understand the notion of ‘object’ in a broad 
and metaphysically undemanding way, as equivalent to what emotion theorists call the particular 
objects of emotion (e.g. physical particulars, persons and animals, events, and states of affairs 
involving such things).4 
Building on the above, it helps to make explicit a distinction – central to the attitudinal theory 
– between attitude (or mode) and content. For propositional attitudes like ‘S believes that P’, we can 
distinguish between the attitude, in this case believing, and the content, ‘P’. This distinction is 
important because if we can individuate content separately from attitude, then the same content 
can be entertained by different attitudes. For example, we can say ‘S believes that P’, but also ‘S 
desires that P’, where the (propositional) content remains the same. If one extends the range of 
intentional states to include intentional experiences, arguably the distinction still applies. Consider 
a paradigmatic visual experience, which takes a physical particular as its object. Arguably, its 
presentational content can be taken up by different non-propositional attitudes, such as visual 
imagination. 
Emotions are often included in lists of intentional attitudes in discussions of intentionality.5 
This is unsurprising since typical emotions are intentional states in at least the minimal sense that 
they are directed toward particular objects, and so have intentional content.6 For example, in a 
paradigmatic episode of anger, there is something I am angry about, such as the individual who 
just insulted me. Likewise, in a paradigmatic episode of happiness, there is something I am happy 
about, such as having just won the race. Emotion-types like fear, anger, love, regret, grief, and 
sadness are, therefore, intentional attitudes. Moreover, on the attitudinal theory, emotions admit 
 
4 See Lyons 1980 and Teroni 2007: 395-415. 
5 See Searle 1983: 1-4; Dennett 1978: 3. 
6 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: Ch.1; Lyons 1980: Ch. 7. 
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of the attitude-content distinction. For example, Fred judges that the dam will flood, while Gill 
fears it will. Furthermore, within the class of emotions, Fred can hate whom Gill loves, or despise 
what Gill admires. So, emotions putatively involve attitudes towards independently specifiable 
contents, that is, contents which can be individuated separately from the emotional attitude.  
This paper does not question the applicability of the attitude-content distinction to emotions; 
it is, however, relevant to the discussion that follows. Let me now outline further distinctions 
between types of intentional attitudes.  
First, we can distinguish between occurrent and dispositional attitudes. An example of the 
latter is Fred’s belief that the earth is round. Fred need not be consciously entertaining this belief. 
Nonetheless, it makes sense to attribute it to him given that he is disposed to do such things as 
assent to it if questioned, use its content as a premise in an argument, and generally behave in such 
a way as seems premised on its truth. Contrastingly, when debating a ‘flat-earther’, Fred explicitly 
entertains his belief that the earth is round; he brings that content ‘before the mind’, and explicitly 
assents to it (either in thought or speech) – as such the belief is occurrent. 
Second, consider that there are intentional attitudes with a phenomenology, and so for which 
there is something-it-is-like to have them (i.e. experiential attitudes). Belief or judgement, and perhaps 
propositional attitudes more broadly, are controversial examples since arguably there is nothing it 
is like to, for example, occurrently judge that the earth is round (although those who defend cognitive 
phenomenology disagree).7 However, those intentional attitudes which are determinate types of 
intentional experience, like perception, imagination, and episodic memory, have distinctive 
phenomenologies, in virtue of being occurrent determinate types of experience, and as token 
experiences of the relevant type.   
Based on these distinctions, we can provide a clarification of the attitudes posited by the 
attitudinal theory.  The evaluative intentional attitudes, which emotions putatively are, are claimed 
 
7 See Pitt 2004: 1-36. 
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to be occurrent experiences, with a distinctive phenomenological profile (or at least this is the 
paradigm case). However, the theory further specifies these evaluative attitudes as felt bodily attitudes 
of action-readiness. So, let’s turn to this development of the view as a bodily-attitudinal view.   
 
1.2 The bodily-attitudinal theory 
To understand the development of the attitudinal theory in terms of felt bodily attitudes of action-
readiness, it is helpful to consider two related theories of emotion. 
First, let’s look at somatic feeling theories of the kind formulated initially by William James. 
Such theories specify occurrent emotions in terms of interoceptive awareness of bodily changes, 
as conscious awareness of internal physiological changes which happen as a result of excitation.8 
Anger, for example, as a distinct emotion type, is specified in terms of a range of relevant felt 
bodily changes, including increased heart rate, muscle tension, increased blood flow, and 
perspiration. According to such theories, our conscious awareness of those occurrent changes is 
the emotion; an emotion is the range of (for James, peripheral) physiological changes experienced 
when undergoing it. We can say more about the causal antecedents of emotions, and the 
characteristic actions following from them. Nevertheless, these are not components of emotion 
according to original somatic feeling theories.  
The bodily-attitudinal theory accepts the following central claim of the somatic feeling theory: 
 
Bodily Phenomenology claim: The phenomenology of emotional experience is (principally) 
bodily.  
 
However, the bodily-attitudinal theory qualifies this. The relevant bodily phenomenology is not, 
pace the original somatic feeling theory, that of atomistic (i.e. distinct, specific and singular) bodily 
 
8 See James 1884: 188-205.  
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changes, for example, one’s heart racing, or sweaty palms. Rather, it is holistic. More precisely, the 
bodily phenomenology in emotional experience is an overall state, which integrates a variety of 
information from different sources, such as facial feedback, the autonomic nervous system, and 
changes in skeletal muscles, combining into a synthetic bodily feel – as a putative bodily gestalt.9 
Given the above, we get the following claim: 
 
Holistic Phenomenology claim: The phenomenology of emotional experience is (principally) 
a holistic bodily phenomenology.  
 
Supporting this, emotion psychologists Anthony Marcel and John Lambie claim that it is 
implausible that explicit awareness of atomistic bodily changes is part of emotions first-order 
phenomenology – that is before taking a reflective stance or attentive attitude towards one’s 
emotion or aspects of it. If this is true, then the awareness of bodily changes posited by the somatic 
feeling theory requires second-order acts of analytic attention.10  
So, for the bodily-attitudinal theory, the experiential dimension of the evaluative attitudes 
(which emotions are) is specified in terms of a holistic bodily phenomenology. It bears noting that 
a qualified somatic feeling theory could accept the Holistic Phenomenology claim if the idea is that 
in emotional experience the body is given as the whole body – as an overall synthetic bodily feel. It 
could specify occurrent emotions in terms of an interoceptive-proprioceptive conscious awareness 
of this putative bodily gestalt. However, the bodily-attitudinal theory rejects a central aspect of 
somatic feeling theories (even so qualified) and puts the idea of a holistic bodily phenomenology 
to use differently.   
To see how, consider what the bodily-attitudinal theory rejects about somatic feeling theories: 
 
9 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: 79; 2014: 27-9; 2015: 302; 2017: 59-62; forthcoming 18-22. See also Claparède 
1928: 128 and Slaby 2008: 431, 437. 
10 Lambie and Marcel 2002: 23. 
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Interoceptive Intentionality claim: the fundamental kind of intentionality in emotional 
experience is interoceptive (i.e. as directed towards the body). 
 
The bodily-attitudinal theory does not, however, reject the claim that emotional experiences are 
intentional states. Instead, it appeals to a different kind of intentional directedness.  
To clarify this, consider Perceptualist theories of emotion (hereafter Perceptualism). Broadly, 
Perceptualism claims that occurrent emotions either are or involve perceptual (or perception-like) 
experiences of evaluative properties, as typically instantiated in the subject’s environment, or as 
exemplified by particular objects in that environment.11 Fear, for example, involves a perceptual 
experience of a particular object as fearsome; disgust involves a perceptual experience of a 
particular object as disgusting. This feature is supposed to be analogous to the way typical sense-
perceptual experiences represent empirical properties (e.g., shape, colour, movement) as properties 
of their intentional objects, and so in good cases either involve or constitute direct access to such 
properties. Moreover, it is plausible that the intentional content of these experiences, so specified 
in terms of the relevant represented properties, partly determine what-it-is-like to undergo the 
relevant experiences. Just as there is something-it-is-like to enjoy a perceptual experience of a red 
and rectangular table, there is something-it-is-like to enjoy an emotional experience of a particular 
object as fearsome. This rough outline of Perceptualism suffices for our purposes. 
The bodily-attitudinal theory rejects essential claims of Perceptualism; principally (i) that 
evaluative properties figure at the level of content, and (ii) the contingency of any bodily 
phenomenology.12 However, it sides with Perceptualism over somatic feeling theories on an 
 
11 See Tappolet 2016: Chap 1; de Sousa 2002: 255; Johnston 2001: 181-214; Poellner 2016: 1-28. The 
disjuncts ‘either are or involve’ and ‘perceptual or perception-like’ are not trivial – they mark out differences 
between strong and weak versions of Perceptualism. 
12 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: ch.6 for further points of departure. 
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important point. In contrast to the latter, and the Interoceptive Intentionality claim, Perceptualism 
characterizes emotional experiences as having a fundamentally exteroceptive kind of intentionality, 
as directed outward toward particular objects in ‘the world’, rather than ‘inward’ towards the body. 
As such, we get the following claim: 
 
Exteroceptive Intentionality claim: the fundamental kind of intentionality in emotional 
experience is exteroceptive (i.e. as directed towards ‘the world’).13 
 
The bodily-attitudinal theory accepts this, but also commits to the following claim: 
 
Phenomenal Intentionality claim: there is a felt ‘aboutness’ to emotional experience which 
(partly) accounts for how it feels to have the relevant emotion.  
 
This claim posits a link between the phenomenology and intentionality of emotional experience. 
In emotional experience, there is not just the experience of the object, but an experience of being 
so directed toward the object, as felt aboutness, or intentionally directed phenomenal feeling. 14  
Now that we have outlined three central claims – Holistic Phenomenology, Exteroceptive 
Intentionality, and Phenomenal Intentionality – consider how the bodily-attitudinal theory 
combines then: 
 
Combined claim: There is a felt aboutness to emotional experience, which (partly) accounts 
for how it feels to have the relevant emotion, as directed outward toward the world; yet the what-
 
13 The Exteroceptive Intentionality claim glosses over a complication concerning the intentionality of 
reflexive emotions (e.g. self-directed pride, shame). However, reflexive emotions are not directed toward 
bodily states, and have, as part of their intentional content, some particular object in the world. 
14 For a defence of phenomenal intentionality see Horgan and Tienson 2002: 520–33 and Kriegel 2013: 1-
26. See Goldie 2000: ch.3 on ‘feelings towards’; see also Kriegel 2014: 424. 
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it-is-likeness of this felt (exteroceptive) aboutness is fundamentally characterized by a holistic 
bodily phenomenology.  
 
In a slogan: emotional experience is intentionally about ‘the world’ not ‘the body’, but it is about 
the world in a bodily way. More precisely – and using the attitude-content distinction – emotional 
experience is a bodily-attitude, manifest in terms of a holistic bodily phenomenology, which targets 
the relevant ‘worldly’ particular objects, and so has the relevant content. The holistic bodily 
phenomenology which putatively characterizes emotional experience is the means by which 
emotional experiences are directed outward towards their objects.15 On this basis, the central claim 
of the bodily-attitudinal theory concerning the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions can 
be framed as follows: 
 
Bodily Intentionality claim: the felt ‘aboutness’ of emotional experience, which (partly) 
captures what-it-is-like to undergo the relevant emotion, is one of the body being directed 
towards – taking a specific attitude towards – the world (i.e. the body as directed towards the 
world).  
 
I now further clarify this bodily-intentionality. 
 
1.3 Clarifying bodily intentionality and action-readiness  
First, it bears re-emphasizing that the bodily intentionality in question is not that of the mind 
directed towards the body, as is characteristic of somatic feeling theories.16 As Deonna and Teroni 
put it: ‘emotions are not attitudes we take towards our body, but felt bodily attitudes directed 
 
15 See Deonna and Teroni 2015: 302 
16 NB: this is the model of intentionality adopted by intentionalists about bodily sensations (see Crane 2003: 
1-27).   
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towards the world’.17 How are we to better understand the felt bodily intentionality posited by the 
bodily-attitudinal theory? Moreover, how does this aspect of the view connect to the claim that 
the relevant bodily attitudes are evaluative? After all, Deonna and Teroni claim it is on the basis of 
their phenomenology that emotions relate us to evaluative properties.18 These two issues are 
clarified in the appeal to the bodily phenomenology being of a holistic action-ready kind.19 
Remember, the claim is that the bodily phenomenology of emotional experience is a synthetic 
gestalt which integrates bodily information from a wide variety of sources. The relevant bodily 
changes (or at least a significant portion of them) combine at the personal level into a holistic 
action-ready bodily phenomenology which is said to be global and outward-looking. As such, the 
relevant bodily attitudes are of a holistic action-ready sort. Further to this, and connecting with the 
evaluative dimension, these felt bodily attitudes of action-readiness contribute essentially to the 
world being presented to the subject in various (evaluatively significant) ways because of their 
holistic action-ready character.20 
Consider fear directed towards an approaching dog. Fear of the dog is an experience of the 
dog as dangerous because it consists in feeling the body’s readiness to act to diminish the dog’s 
likely impact, such that one’s body is ready to ‘contribute to the neutralization of what provokes 
the fear’.21 Alternatively, consider disgust towards rotting meat. Disgust towards the rotten meat 
is an experience of the meat as disgusting because it consists in feeling the body’s readiness to act 
 
17 Deonna and Teroni 2012: 80 (see also Slaby 2008: 436). 
18 Deonna and Teroni 2012: 79. 
19 For discussions of action readiness in the psychological literature, see Arnold 1960; Frijda 1986; 2007 
(see section 3). 
20 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: 79-80; 2015: 303; forthcoming 20-22. 
21 There is the further claim that the fearing attitude, so specified in terms of its holistic action-ready character, 
is correct iff the object has the relevant property. Put otherwise, it is correct to ‘neutralize’ what provokes 
fear iff it is a threat, and that is why the attitude is said to be both fitting and reasonable if the dog is, in fact, 
dangerous (cf. Dokic and Lemaire 2015: 280).  
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to ‘prevent the object from entering into contact with it’.22 Finally, consider aesthetic admiration 
towards a painting. Admiration for the painting is an experience of the painting as beautiful 
because it consists in feeling one’s body open up to sustained and expanding exploration of the 
painting. One might wonder whether all emotion types could be individuated in this way. While 
this is an important issue, let’s put it to one side for the moment (issues related to it arise in 2.1).23  
So, bodily phenomenology of the relevant holistic action-ready sort – as an outward-looking 
form of bodily consciousness – is central to precisifying the supposed felt bodily intentionality of 
emotional experience, in which the world is presented as significant (i.e. evaluatively relevant). As 
Deonna and Teroni put it ‘the idea that emotions are felt bodily stances we take towards aspects 
of the environment is amenable to the idea that they are evaluative attitudes’.24  
In sum, we putatively get bodily feelings into emotional experience in the right way by 
specifying the relevant exteroceptively directed evaluative attitudes, which emotions putatively are, 
in terms of holistic felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. As such the holistic bodily gestalt – 
which captures both emotional phenomenology and its felt aboutness – has significance beyond 
the body; this holistic bodily gestalt puts us into direct contact with matters of (seeming) 
significance ‘in the world’.25 We now have a clarified proposal concerning the nature of the felt 
 
22 Deonna and Teroni 2012: 80-1. 
23 This ‘specificity objection’ is a central objection to the Jamesian theory (see Deonna and Teroni 2017: 
55-9). 
24 Deonna and Teroni forthcoming: 20. The model of intentionality is therefore not analogous to displaced 
perception, namely seeing that such and such is the case on the basis of a (non-epistemic) seeing of something 
else. The view is not that I judge that the particular object of my emotion is significant by having an 
experience of the relevant bodily phenomenology, such that I am indirectly aware of significance in the 
world by being directly aware of my body, where the presence of the relevant bodily phenomenology is a 
reliable indicator of such significance. This latter view is close to Prinz 2004. Deonna and Teroni rule this 
out 2012: 86. 
25 Colombetti (2011: 297, 310) goes further, suggesting that the relevant holistic bodily phenomenology 
puts us in contact with evaluative properties (cf. Dokic and Lemaire 2015: 280). 
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bodily intentionality and phenomenology of emotional experience on the bodily-attitudinal theory. 
The next section considers objections.  
 
2. Objections to the theory 
2.1 Absence of bodily phenomenology  
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that felt bodily attitudes of action readiness constitute 
the exteroceptive (phenomenal) intentionality of some emotional experiences, arguably they 
cannot do so in all cases. This is because certain ‘cool’ or ‘calm’ emotional experiences, such as 
admiration, reverence, and regret, can arguably occur without any attendant bodily 
phenomenology.26  
Consider the following case. Out walking in the Alps, Gill feels moved when confronted with 
a particularly stunning vista. We might think it plausible that someone can experience such an 
emotion without any action-ready bodily phenomenology. Consider the following modification. 
Say Fred has been severely physically paralyzed from the neck down, such that he is incapable of 
experiencing interoceptive-proprioceptive action-ready bodily phenomenology. Nonetheless, Fred 
is taken to see the stunning vista. It is plausible that Fred could be emotionally moved by the 
grandeur of the natural scene even though ex hypothesi he cannot experience the relevant 
phenomenology. Something similar is arguably empirically verified in cases of individuals with 
severely impaired bodily feedback and awareness, such as those with severe spinal cord injuries 
who nonetheless enjoy rich emotional lives.27 
 
26 See Lambie 2009: 272-280; Poellner 2016: 13; Stocker 2010: 401-23; Prinz 2004: 57, 72; James 1884: 191, 
cf. Ibid: 201-2. 
27 Cobos et al. 2002: 251-69. This is reminiscent of Canon’s (1927) challenge to Jamesian somatic feeling 
theories. See Smith (2014: 101-2) who questions whether the bodily-attitudinal view can appeal to the ‘as if 
loop’ response (Damasio 2006: 155) where one simulates the relevant bodily state. Smith’s worry is, broadly, 
that as originally proposed by Damasio the relevant ‘state of feeling’ which is simulated in the absence of a 
genuine bodily response is (on Damasio’s taxonomy of the relevant states) non-conscious (see his 2000: 37), 
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The upshot is that if bodily phenomenology is not essential to some emotional experiences, 
this undermines the claim that holistic bodily feelings of action readiness constitute the 
intentionality of emotions since the relevant bodily phenomenology is not present in those cases. 
Such ‘cool’ or ‘calm’ emotions may have associated bodily phenomenologies of the relevant action-
ready kind; in the case of being moved by the natural scene, subjects may typically experience a 
form of bodily relaxation connected to an explorative posture. However, it seems possible to 
experience awe without such action-ready bodily phenomenology. Further to this, even in those 
cases where there is action-ready bodily phenomenology, consideration of cases without it brings 
into question whether it is this aspect of emotional experience which presents the particular object 
as significant. Furthermore, action-ready bodily phenomenology may seem inessential to the 
emotionality of the relevant experience since it is possible to have the emotion without it.28  
One way of responding to this objection is to claim that the relevant ‘cool’ or ‘calm’ emotions 
are higher cognitive emotions and that the bodily-attitudinal theory does not apply to these, but 
to a more limited class (e.g. fear, disgust, happiness, sadness). One could also claim that the relevant 
non-bodily cases are evaluative judgements, which may have essential links to emotions but are 
not equivalent to them, and possess different phenomenological profiles. Another route would be 
to insist on dispositional readings of the relevant class of emotion reports, such that there is no 
occurrent mental state with a putative non-bodily emotional phenomenology. 
 
whereas the states which Deonna and Teroni are, at least primarily, interested in are conscious episodes 
which are ‘essentially felt’ (Deonna and Teorni 2012: 18). As such, the relevant simulated state would not 
be manifest at the conscious level. However, more needs saying on this issue, and it should be noted if 
Deonna and Teorni were to adopt a different taxonomy of the relevant states, arguing that ‘state of feeling’ 
posited by Damasio could be manifest at the conscious level then arguably this response would remain a 
live option.  
28 This also raises individuation problems: type-identification of those (non-bodily) emotions in the terms 
of the bodily-attitudinal theory would not be a live option (see Lindquist et al. 2012: 121-43). 
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However, regardless of the plausibility of such moves, they restrict the scope of the view in an 
unappealing way. The better response would be to argue that, despite claims to the contrary, there 
are no ‘cool’ or ‘calm’ emotions, where that is taken to mean the complete absence of the relevant 
bodily phenomenology. One way to explain intuitions about their possibility would be to claim 
that thought experiments like the above are parasitic on cases where the bodily phenomenology is 
less intense. Given the psychological reality of the latter cases, we are tempted to imagine that 
there could be cases in which there is a complete absence of bodily phenomenology. Although 
arguably a closer examination of actual cases shows that there is always bodily phenomenology in 
play. However, as noted above if there are empirically verified cases in which, due to neurological 
damage, the subject cannot undergo experiences with the relevant action-ready bodily 
phenomenology, then it will not be easy for the view to dismiss the objection as resting on a 
confusion between more or less intense instances of bodily phenomenology.  
Nonetheless, the view might push the claim that, on closer inspection, we find that it is 
mistaken to think there is a complete absence of the relevant bodily phenomenology in such cases. 
Consider the following re-description of our example. Perhaps the subject who is paralyzed from 
the neck down is still in some sense motivated to move, or be moved, seeking the adjustment of 
their bodily orientation to see the Alps better. Further to this, the subject can still move their eyes 
and facial muscles. Moreover, given we are taking a holistic approach to bodily phenomenology, 
they may also experience increased heart rate and changes in breathing. So, if we account for the 
role of the full range of bodily feelings, then despite the subject’s inability to move, the above 
experiential components may suffice for an experience of action-ready bodily phenomenology; 
indeed, once we take such components into account, it looks more difficult to subtract the body 
altogether. 
In response, we may first draw attention to the fact that any motivation which our subject may 
have to be moved (say by a third-party) to see the Alps better, say as manifest in seeking the 
adjustment of their bodily orientation, could be accounted for as follows. Arguably what captures 
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some such motivation to be moved is the presence of a non-bodily desire which is a consequence of 
their prior emotional experience of admiration. What our subject desires is the obtaining of a state 
of affairs, namely that they are moved in such a way that they can see the Alps better, but that is 
best construed as a conative state downstream of the emotional experience itself. As such, it is 
questionable whether the motivational action-ready phenomenology highlighted in the paragraph 
above is in fact that of admiration, and not rather that of a desire, which while connected to 
emotion, seems a contingent consequence rather than a necessary feature. 
More importantly, though, the central problem with the above line is that the bodily-
phenomenology it highlights arguably falls short of capturing an instance of the specific, type-
identifying action-ready bodily phenomenology that is said by the theory to characterize 
admiration. Remember, admiration is said to be an experience of the relevant object as beautiful or 
admirable because it consists in feeling one’s body open up to sustained and expanding exploration of 
the relevant object. So, concerning the re-described example, we may accept that there is some 
action-ready bodily phenomenology present, for example in the changes in facial muscles as linked 
to attention, or increased interest in the object as reflected in increased heart rate. However, what 
is arguably lacking is the specific rich and complex action-ready bodily phenomenology which 
purportedly constitutes and type-identifies admiration, such that one’s body, as an overall bodily 
gestalt, is felt to open up to sustained and expanding exploration of the relevant object.  
Let me expand on this point. We might question how our paralyzed subject can genuinely feel 
ready-for sustained and expanding exploration, as a rich and complex bodily gestalt (unifying bodily 
feelings from a wide range of different sources) given their bodily paralysis. Put otherwise, the bodily 
phenomenology that seems (on the view under consideration) to individuate admiration surely 
enjoys a richness and complexity which would presumably suffice to distinguish it from other 
‘positive’ emotions that include attentional focus and explorative motivations (such as amorous 
feeling or affective forms of curiosity) such that that bodily phenomenology goes beyond merely 
the ability to move one’s eyes and facial muscles, and register (some) bodily changes (e.g. increased 
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breathing tempo).29 So, while we might grant that the former experiential components are 
sufficient for an experience of some action-ready bodily phenomenology (and so perhaps some 
affective state), they are arguably not sufficient, given the claims of the bodily-attitudinal theory, 
for an experience of admiration. Connected to this point, we might also think that if the action-
ready bodily phenomenology in such cases is sufficiently muted or truncated, then it is questionable 
whether it is that it is the feature in virtue of which the significance of the object is manifest. 
Note, the critic of the bodily-attitudinal theory can accept that if the re-description of the 
example is correct – there is some action-ready bodily phenomenology – then the subject's 
emotional experience will be different from that of un-paralyzed subjects. Further to this, we need 
not rule out that subjects with spinal cord injuries have emotional lives that are in some respects 
different (and perhaps even attenuated) from those of un-paralyzed subjects. However, the bodily-
attitudinal theory claims that the relevant action-ready bodily phenomenology type-identifies 
admiration as the emotion it is. And arguably in the absence of that specific bodily-phenomenology 
the theory could read as implying that it then becomes questionable whether our paralyzed subject 
experiences admiration, and that implication is in need of further clarification and discussion from 
those who defend the theory.  
 
29 A further issue interesting issue is whether if the individual in our example was once not paralyzed this 
would have any effect (or lessen the force of the objection in the body of the text). Presumably, the idea 
(in defence of the bodily-attitudinal theory) would be that an (experiential) memory of the relevant 
emotional experience with the associated bodily phenomenology could be invoked as co-present with the 
experience, and this could 'make up for' the absence of some of the relevant bodily phenomenology. While 
more needs to be said on this complex issue, one potential issue with such a response would be that it is 
dependent on our subject having previously thematized (taken as an object of conscious attention) the bodily 
phenomenology of a previous instance of admiration such they could remember what-it-feels-like, where that 
would not simply be a matter of remembering the relevant particular object and its properties. There is also 
the further issue of detailing the connection between whatever bodily phenomenology is still present in 
such a case and the remembered phenomenology. I thank a referee at Philosophical Studies for drawing my attention 
to this option. 
 18 
Generalizing from the above analysis, we can say the following: The objection we have been 
considering moves from pointing to putative cases in which there is a complete absence of bodily 
phenomenology to the absence of the relevant bodily phenomenology. In the case re-described, as 
including some action-ready bodily phenomenology, the bodily-attitudinal theory seems to imply, 
given its commitments, that it is unclear whether admiration is experienced given what bodily 
phenomenology is present. The critic, however, can push the line that the default presumption, 
which would need strong considerations to be defeated, is that admiration is experienced, and we 
should not hamstring what counts as an experience of admiration by tying it so tightly to bodily-
phenomenology.  
As a final point, a more concessive response from the bodily-attitudinal theory is as follows. 
What might be appealed to is a broader category of action-ready attentional phenomena, some of 
which may less saliently involve the body (e.g. directing one’s mental attention to a specific object). 
As such, it would be action-tendencies per se that constitute the outwardly directed phenomenology 
of emotion, where the former is realized bodily or mentally. Indeed, Deonna and Teroni explicitly 
mention this as a way of expanding on the theory.30 This disjunctive view is a potentially fruitful 
development of the theory, although since such a view would not be an exclusively bodily view I 
don’t consider its merits here. 
 
2.2. What kind of felt bodily awareness 
On the bodily-attitudinal theory, awareness of the body is implicated in the emotional experience 
insofar as it characterizes what Deonna and Teroni call the attendant attitudinal phenomenology.31 This 
attendant attitudinal phenomenology is supposed to be of a holistic bodily and action-ready 
character, and explanatory of the way the holistic bodily gestalt puts us into contact with matters 
of significance in the world. However, what kind of awareness is this?  
 
30 Deonna and Teroni 2015: 303 (fn.13) 
31 Ibid: 308. 
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First, note that certain statements of the view might give the impression that the relevant kind 
of awareness is intentional. In the examples provided, we are told subjects feel the body’s readiness 
to act in relation to the object, and that subjects enjoy an awareness of one’s body adopting a specific 
stance towards an object.32 Psychologist Édouard Claparède, an early proponent of a similar view, 
talks in comparable terms: ‘what…consciousness seizes in emotion is…the form of the organism 
itself that is to say its attitude’.33  These statements give the impression that there are two instances 
of intentional awareness; (i) awareness of the relevant particular object and (ii) awareness of the 
body’s readiness to act, under the relevant aspect (e.g. as hostilely prepared). Neither, however, 
capture the bodily-intentionality required by the bodily-attitudinal theory, since the one involving 
the body is mind to object (where the object is a bodily state), rather than body to object. Alternatively, 
the formulation ‘the subject experiences her body holistically as taking an attitude towards a certain 
object’ suggests the intentionality of emotional experience consists of being directed toward this 
complex whole. As such, emotional experience would include a higher-order intentionality, as 
directed towards the overall state.  
Deonna and Teroni rule out both readings. On the bodily-attitudinal theory, emotional 
experiences are non-reflective states with only one form of first-order intentional directedness, 
namely body to object. We are (paradigmatically) neither intentionally aware of the emotion itself, nor 
intentionally aware of the body; the relevant action-ready bodily state is definitively not supposed 
to be an object of experience, and so is not part of its content. As they put it: ‘when appeal is made 
to feeling of the body here, the ‘of’ is not that of intentionality. It is rather that of specification and 
does not refer to the representation of changes in bodily parts, but to…felt bodily engagement’.34 
So perhaps the above misreadings can be avoided with careful formulations. For example, we 
might frame the view as follows: emotional experience is a holistic bodily attitude toward a 
 
32 See Deonna and Teroni 2012: 79-80; 2015: 303; forthcoming: 19. 
33 Claparède 1928: 128. 
34 See Deonna and Teroni forthcoming: 20.  
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particular object. The problem, however, with this formulation is that it has dropped the ‘felt’ 
qualifier to the relevant attitude. However, once that is included – emotional experience is a felt 
holistic bodily attitude toward a particular object, or is a felt bodily engagement with a particular object 
– the ‘what kind of felt bodily awareness’ objection can be raised.  
Before pressing this objection, we should note an important distinction between two claims, 
which the distinction between experiential and non-experiential attitudes (section 1.1) glosses over. 
The claim that some attitudes are experiential, and so have a phenomenology, might just be taken 
to mean that the relevant overall state, ‘the attitude’, is an intentional experience. One can accept 
this way of thinking about certain attitudes – namely, as determinate types of intentional 
experiences – while rejecting the claim that such experiences have any attendant attitudinal 
phenomenology. 
Contrastingly, the appeal to an attendant attitudinal phenomenology is a stronger claim. On 
this view to claim that the relevant attitude is experiential, or more perspicuously to claim that it is 
in some sense experienced, is to say that there is a phenomenologically manifest attitudinal component 
to the experience which is not equated with (a) the overall state being an experience, or (b) the 
content component (the object as presented in experience). Deonna and Teroni make the stronger 
claim for the evaluative attitudes which emotional experiences putatively are. 
To further see their motivation for positing attendant attitudinal phenomenology in emotional 
experience, it is helpful to consider the so-called transparency of experience and the way in which 
emotional experience is non-transparent according to Deonna and Teroni. According to the 
‘transparency principle’, when we introspectively focus on experience itself, rather than what 
experience is about or directed towards, we arguably find nothing to attend to but (apparent) 
objects and their properties. As it is sometimes put, we seem to see right through experience to 
the objects (apparently) outside, including their properties. Consider introspectively attending to a 
visual experience of a red and round ball. According to some philosophers, the only properties 
that seem salient—the only properties that capture how things are experientially for me are 
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properties of the (apparent) external object, that is redness and roundness as represented 
properties of the ball, not any ‘intrinsic’ properties of the experience.35 Now, according to Deonna 
and Teroni, this transparency principle is not true of emotional experience: ‘as opposed to what 
happens in perception, the exercise of attending to one’s emotional experience as opposed to what 
it is about does not culminate in the contemplation of the very same properties in both instances. 
This is clear when we appreciate how switching one’s attention from what an emotional experience 
is about to the experience itself dissolves its intentional structure’.36 The fact that emotional 
experience is non-transparent in this way is suggestive of the claim that ‘emotional phenomenology 
is not exclusively that of something making itself manifest’37, and therefore supports the positing 
of attendant attitudinal phenomenology as a phenomenologically manifest attitudinal component 
to the experience. 
Given the above, we can rule out the following idea. While the relevant bodily feelings, as felt 
attitudes of action readiness, can be understood as vehicles of exteroceptive content, at the 
experiential level they are not phenomenologically manifest in any sense, but rather are reflected 
in the kinds of properties the objects of emotional experience show up as having (e.g. action-ready 
properties, see section 3). Put otherwise, such bodily feelings would be non-phenomenal constituents, 
perhaps playing a pre-structuring role.38 Such a view would not be committed to any attendant 
bodily-attitudinal phenomenology.  
So, what is needed is a clarification of the kind of bodily awareness implicated by the bodily-
attitudinal theory in its talk of felt bodily attitudes, where this goes beyond just saying that the 
relevant emotions, as kinds of attitudes, are experiences, and further substantiates the supposed 
 
35 Ibid: 308. On the transparency of perceptual experience see Harman 1990: 38; Tye 2002: 139; Martin 
2002: 380-81. 
36 Deonna and Teroni 2015: 308 
37 Ibid: 308. 
38 This might be closer to what Slaby (2008: 436-440) has in mind.  
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attendant attitudinal phenomenology. Moreover, we need to do so without slipping back into 
intentional characterizations. Meeting this challenge proves difficult. 
First, note that the relevant bodily awareness might be modelled after background 
phenomenological awareness of the body. For example, consider the kind of awareness one has 
of the pressure of objects on one’s body, say the pressure of a chair arm digging into one’s side 
when writing at a desk. When one first sits down and shuffles around to get comfortable, one may 
have an explicit phenomenal awareness of the bodily sensations of pressure. Though when one 
‘settles in’ such sensations typically fade into the phenomenological background – they are no 
longer explicitly noticed or attended to.  
However, this kind of background phenomenological awareness of the body is not obviously 
that which the bodily-attitudinal theory requires, as a putative awareness of the attendant attitudinal 
phenomenology. To see this, note that the posited holistic bodily phenomenology seems like the 
kind of thing that needs to be at least to some extent more explicitly phenomenologically manifest, 
that is in the foreground rather than the background when compared with the awareness of those 
tactile sensations. Consider the action-ready bodily awareness I putatively have in fear, as my 
bodies readiness to contribute to the neutralization of what provokes fear; is it natural to describe 
this as merely peripheral or marginal? At the least, it is not clearly analogous to that ‘peripheral’ or 
‘marginal’ background phenomenological awareness which subjects have of their bodies when 
settled into an activity which consumes their attention, that is where bodily sensations fade into 
the background. Connected to this, it is unclear how a bodily phenomenology which was part of 
a background, marginal ‘phenomenal buzz’ in the manner of those background tactile sensations 
described above could seem to the subject be that which presents significant properties of external 
objects. 
Somewhat bracketing the above worry though, a defender of this approach might say the 
following in response. In cases in which there is no need to inhibit the emotional response, that is 
where it is possible to let the action-tendencies ‘follow their course’, then the attendant attitudinal 
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phenomenology could be thought of as being in the background on the model suggested. 
Contrastingly, in cases in which we cannot let the emotion follow its course (e.g. I have to restrain 
myself from physically attacking the individual who makes an offensive comment), or when the 
emotion is sufficiently ‘overpowering’ (e.g. being ‘struck down’ by some terrible news and 
collapsing), the bodily phenomenology would be in the forefront.  
This is an important distinction between different types of cases, although it does lead to a 
disjunctive account of the kind of awareness subjects have of the relevant attendant attitudinal 
phenomenology. Further to this, the critic might respond that we need to keep in check a 
distinction between action-ready phenomenology and the phenomenology of carrying out of the 
relevant actions themselves. It is plausible that the bodily phenomenology of carrying out the 
associated actions when ‘going along with the flow’ as contrasted with ‘restrained inhibiting’, is 
very different. Yet, arguably this is a difference in what-it-feels-like to carry out an action which 
naturally follows from one’s emotion – one’s action being what one was ready for – from what-it-
feels-like to restrain oneself from the action one’s emotion prepared one for. Sexual attraction 
provides an illustration. Consider the phenomenological difference between moving towards the 
object of one’s sexual attraction and restraining oneself from doing so. This is a distinction between 
what-it-feels-like to carry out certain actions or not, in the context of one’s emotion preparing one 
for them, rather than a distinction in the kind of background vs foreground awareness we might 
have of any action-ready phenomenology. Put otherwise, we have hit on a distinction in the 
phenomenology of action out of emotion, but this marks out phenomenological contrast downstream 
from the (putative) action-ready phenomenology of emotional experience. As such, it is not clear 
we have been provided with a distinction which allows us to answer the 'what kind of felt bodily 
awareness' objection.  
As a final comment on background awareness, let me also note that, regardless of issues about 
the phenomenology or distinctions between types of cases (which are of course difficult to 
adjudicate), it is contentious whether background awareness is non-intentional. Consider the case 
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of absorbed writing. While focusing on the laptop screen and keyboard, as the focal point or 
‘theme’ of one’s visual experience, the table, surrounding books, and scattered papers, all form 
part of the background, as ‘filling out’ the visual scene (as the ground in the figure-ground relation). 
They are, ex hypothesi, not the explicit focus of attention, but they plausibly characterize the 
phenomenal-intentional background; they are part of what is presented in visual experience, as part 
of how one is visually appeared to. As such, they contribute to the overall intentional content of 
the experience (i.e. the visual scene as it appears to me). Given this, it is therefore plausible that 
we can (and often do) have background intentional awareness, and that, therefore, intentional 
awareness is not plausibly co-extensive with focal phenomenal awareness. But, returning to the 
bodily-attitudinal theory, any putative ‘background’ phenomenology of felt bodily engagement, in 
terms of attendant bodily-attitudinal phenomenology, isn’t supposed to have this character. The 
background awareness required by the view (if it makes this appeal) can’t be analogous to our 
peripheral, background awareness of objects on the margins of our visual field. This awareness is, 
after all, a species of intentional awareness, and remember according to Deonna and Teroni the 
relevant action-ready bodily state is not supposed to be an object of experience (even a peripheral 
or marginal one), and so is not part of its content. 
Before moving on, let me highlight a point concerning the preceding discussion. I do not take 
myself to have definitively ruled out that the bodily-attitudinal view, in its positing of attendant 
attitudinal phenomenology and a distinctive kind of bodily awareness putatively enjoyed in 
emotional experience, can appeal to some form of background awareness. Rather I have merely 
suggested that there are some problems with doing so given familiar models for thinking about 
such background awareness and that therefore more clarification is required if this is the route that 
is taken by the view.  
Alternatively, one might suggest that the required kind of awareness is so-called ‘pre-reflective’ 
bodily awareness, as something that is neither background phenomenal buzz, nor something of 
which we have ‘object’ awareness. To substantiate this latter claim, the bodily-attitudinal theory 
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could appeal to the phenomenological notion of the ‘lived body’. Giovanna Colombetti clarifies 
this with the following example:  
 
As I am typing these words, my awareness is mainly focused on the characters that appear on the 
screen, and on their meaning. Yet at the same time we can say that I am pre-reflectively aware of 
my fingers as that part of my body through which the typing occurs, and in general of my body as 
that through which various experiences are made possible. Every perceptual experience is thus in 
part also an experience of my body. (Colombetti 2011: 531)39 
 
We can bracket whether this is credible as a claim about the kinds of awareness implicated in 
paradigmatic sense-perceptual experience. 
The central problem with this proposal as applied to the bodily-attitudinal theory is that it 
arguably falls prey to some of the same objections considered above concerning the idea of 
background phenomenal awareness. Remember, the so-called attendant attitudinal 
phenomenology is supposed to be of an action-ready holistic bodily kind which possesses a kind 
of felt aboutness. So, we might think that it is not merely that such phenomenology is a part of the 
experience which we are not ‘mainly’ attending to or some manifest condition of its possibility. 
Instead, it is supposed to characterize the central, indeed definitive, what-it-is-likeness of emotional 
experience. 
To highlight the disanalogy consider the example provided by Colombetti. When, in visual 
experience, attention is consumed by the relevant object, as in absorbed typing, it is plausible that 
I don’t notice any tactile phenomenology. Perhaps with a switch of attention or breakdown in 
absorption I can become aware of my fingers as that part of my body through which the typing 
occurs (e.g. if the words stop appearing on the screen, I may focus attention on my pressing of the 
keys). However, it is odd to think that any such tactile phenomenology, before some attention 
 
39 See also Zahavi 2005: 63. 
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switch, exhibits ‘felt aboutness’, as involving ‘awareness of one’s fingers adopting a specific stance 
towards an object’, and so as analogous to what Deonna and Teroni say in the emotion case. So 
even if the notion of the pre-reflective ‘lived body’ makes sense,40 it is not clear whether it is of 
much help in answering the question of what kind of awareness talk of attendant attitudinal bodily-
phenomenology implicates. As such, the bodily-attitudinal theory needs to explain in more detail 
how it would draw on such notions to answer this problem – which it has not yet. 
As a final point on this issue, a defender of the bodily-attitudinal theory might argue that the 
putative analogy with touch and tactile phenomenology is (for the reasons given) inapt. 
Alternatively, we can focus on awareness of bodily action towards the environment. In such cases, 
so the response goes, we have examples of non-emotional felt bodily stances that it makes sense 
to describe in terms of their targets, for example, the consciousness of one’s body when one 
attempts to jump over an obstacle.  However, it is unclear whether this kind of bodily 
phenomenology is well-suited to enlist in making a case for the bodily-attitudinal theory. One 
problem is that of distinguishing specifically emotional phenomenology from other cases of 
bodily-action toward the environment. Consider the following case: The way one’s body feels in 
attempting to jump over a fence, to get to something I am interested in on the other side, may be 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from, for example, the kind of ‘approach and exploration’ 
phenomenology putatively characteristic of certain forms of admiration or emotional curiosity. 
Further to this what is it about the action-ready bodily phenomenology in the emotion case that 
makes it apt to present that which is significant for the subject in a way categorically different from the 
action-ready bodily phenomenology involved in the non-emotional felt bodily stance of attempting 
 
40 In separate work I detail considerations in favour of the view that ‘pre-reflective’ non-intentional 
awareness, in general, cannot be made sense of.  
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to jump over a fence? More needs saying on the connection to bodily action (I return to questions 
concerning the nature of action-ready phenomenology in section 3).41 
Based on the above discussion, until we have a more detailed characterization of the kind of 
bodily awareness implicated by the bodily-attitudinal theory – as cashing out the supposed 
attendant attitudinal phenomenology – then arguably this aspect of the view is problematic. One 
position in the philosophy of mind which might be sceptical that the view can make good on 
precisifying the relevant bodily awareness would be ‘Pure Intentionalism’. According to that view, 
the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content.42 When it comes 
to mental states and awareness there are only two types: there is phenomenal awareness of objects 
and their properties (even if only peripherally or marginally), and fact-awareness, as awareness that 
‘such and such is the case’.43  
Importantly, in the course of defending their view, Deonna and Teroni explicitly reject ‘Pure 
Intentionalism’ as true of emotions.44 Their appeal to an attendant attitudinal phenomenology ties 
the view to ‘Impure Intentionalism’.45 According to that view, the relevant attitude or intentional 
mode of the experience is a phenomenologically manifest component which, along with the 
relevant content, determines what-it-is-like to have the relevant experience (and contributes to 
individuating it). However, such a view, and the framework it proposes, is controversial. 
Connecting to the above, one of the central problems, which the bodily-attitudinal theory inherits, 
 
41 Note, this is a familiar demarcation problem: on what basis do we distinguish some class of experiences 
(in this case emotions) from ones that seem non-superficially similar to them. I don’t mean to suggest that 
only the bodily-attitudinal theory has to solve such problems (any theory of emotion has to).  
42 See Tye 1995; 2002: 137-51; Harman: 1990 31-52; Byrne: 2001: 199-240. 
43 See Dretske 1999: 39-65 and Shoemaker 1996: 5, 205. 
44 Deonna and Teroni 2015: 308-9. 
45 See Crane 2003: 1-27; 2009a: 474-491; Horgan and Tienson 2002; 520–33 For a precursor to this view 
see Searle 1983: 4-6, 12. 
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is giving a detailed characterization of the relevant kind of awareness we have of the putative 
attendant attitudinal phenomenology.  
However, it bears noting that ‘Impure Intentionalism’, in general, has a view of intentionality 
where the relevant structure is still that of a (phenomenologically manifest) mental-attitude to 
object, not that of a bodily-attitude to object. As such, while the bodily-attitudinal theory falls in 
with ‘Impure Intentionalism’ concerning the claim that attitudes make a phenomenological 
difference – as phenomenologically manifest qua attitudes – such a ‘companions in guilt’ response 
doesn’t further clarify the specific bodily awareness implicated by the view. As such, the ‘what kind 
of bodily awareness’ objection is significant, and the bodily-attitudinal theory should address it 
directly. 
We can now surmise. This section has raised two objections to the bodily-attitudinal theory. 
Defenders of the view need to say more about these issues and recognize that the kind of felt 
bodily intentionality their view posits requires further clarification. However, let me be clear on 
the import of the discussion. It should be noted that the ‘absence of bodily phenomenology’ 
objection was grounded in one detailed example, namely admiration, which it is difficult to account 
for on most theories of the emotion (although perhaps the reader might consider whether similar 
considerations extend to regret and reverence). More generally, the kind of demarcation problems we 
have encountered throughout the discussion of both objections – the ability of the theory to 
distinguish between emotions and non-emotional mental states, and different types of emotion – 
is a familiar problem for all theories, so I don’t mean to imply that only the bodily-attitudinal view 
has to find answers to these problems, or indeed that it is only the solutions offered by that theory 
which are contestable. Finally, it is worth noting that much of discussion of this section has turned 
on probing and reflecting on specific aspects of the phenomenology of emotional experience qua 
what is ‘implicit’ vs ‘explicit’, in the ‘background’ rather than the ‘foreground’ etc. And while the 
criticisms raised point to areas in which the bodily-attitudinal view needs to do more to clarify and 
defend its position, these are contentious issues concerning which it would be unwise to level 
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overly-strong verdicts. The next section turns more explicitly to felt action-readiness to discuss 
how one might challenge what the bodily-attitudinal theory has to say on this issue.  
 
3. Felt Action-Readiness 
3.1 Object-based action-readiness 
Let me start this section by clarifying the phenomenology of action-readiness, as manifest in 
emotional experience, by reference to the following passage from Nico Frijda: 
 
Action readiness transforms a neutral world into one with places of danger and openings 
towards safety, in fear, with targets for kissing and their being accessible for it, in enamoration, 
with roads stretching out endlessly before one, in fatigue, misery, and despair, with insistent 
calls for entry or participation or consumption, in enjoyment (Frijda 2007: 205).  
 
Frijda is highlighting a ubiquitous feature of emotional experience, namely felt action-readiness. 
Deonna and Teroni contend that the bodily-attitudinal theory is especially well-placed to capture 
it. According to that view, felt action readiness is a matter of holistic action-ready bodily attitudes 
being directed towards the world, such that our having the relevant action-ready attitudes 
contributes essentially to the world being presented as significant in various ways.46 As they put it: 
‘in emotion, we feel a bodily attitude towards a given object, which amounts to saying that we feel 
the way our body is geared towards the object we are facing. The body is felt in the form of a 
gestalt of bodily sensations, which consists in being ready to respond in a given way to the object’.47 
If the bodily-attitudinal theory is the best way of capturing the phenomenon of action-readiness, 
then that is a significant point in favour of the view. It would also offer a way of diffusing previous 
worries concerning the supposed attendant attitudinal phenomenology; the attendant attitudinal 
 
46 Deonna and Teroni 2012: 80.  
47 Ibid: 87. See also Claparède 1928: 124-139. 
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phenomenology is the so-directed felt action-readiness, and that is something with which we are 
phenomenologically familiar. 
However, the bodily-attitudinal interpretation of action-readiness is not the only way to go.  A 
plausible, and arguably preferable, alternative is presented below by developing further comments 
from Frijda. The respects in which this alternative is preferable is that it better reflects the relevant 
phenomenology, as discussed in this section, and can deal more neatly with theoretical issues 
concerning differences in content – the topic of the final section. 
Action-readiness is paradigmatically felt; in typical cases of emotional experience there is a 
phenomenology of action-readiness. However, nothing forces one into cashing this out in terms 
of bodily-attitudinal phenomenology. An alternative is framing felt action-readiness in terms of the 
object seeming a certain way. Note, this does not undermine the action-readiness being ‘felt’ since 
objects seeming a certain way is agreed to be part of what determines the phenomenal character 
of intentional experience. Frijda agrees: phenomenology does not fall out of the picture because 
‘in first-order emotional experience, the experienced meanings are felt as properties of the objects 
or events perceived…if attention is fully focused on the world, emotion experience is out there. 
The meanings are out there, phenomenally’.48 Further to this, he claims ‘the felt qualities include 
those of being targets for action, their perceived instrumentality for ongoing or planned actions, 
their nearness for grasping’.49  
This points in the direction of an object-side interpretation of action readiness. Frijda goes on to 
elucidate action readiness in a way which supports this interpretation: 
 
Action readiness is reflected in the objects’ and places demand characters of ‘to be removed’, 
‘to be distanced from’, or ‘to be united with’. The demand characters differ subtly from the 
affordances and hodological properties. The latter reflect appraisal of what one could or could 
 
48 Frijda 2007: 203-4.  
49 Ibid: 203-4. 
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not do; the former reflect one’s being set to do or actually doing, with its control precedence. 
During emotion, the felt quality, ‘desirable’ changes into that of ‘desired!’ of ‘an object-to-be-
possessed-not-in-possession’ into ‘the object-to-be-possessed!’. With joy, experience shifts 
from ‘the world as open and available’ to ‘the world within reach’, ‘at one’s fingertips’, ‘to-be-
participating in’. (Frijda 2007: 205) 
 
So, action readiness in emotional experience has several features: (1) it concerns the particular 
objects of those experiences; (2) those particular objects possess demand characters; (3) the 
demand character of particular objects is a way they appear (i.e., part of their aspectual shape).50  
However, importantly demand character is not to be understood in terms of those objects 
having everyday affordance or instrumental value properties, as representing generic, and modally 
open action-possibilities (i.e. ‘could or could not’). Demand character is not equivalent to the way 
objects are presented in what Jean-Paul Sartre and the Gestalt psychologists call ‘hodological 
space’. We can understand the latter as an external space or environment – what Max Scheler calls 
a ‘milieu’ – where the subject has an experiential encounter with everyday objects as instruments 
or obstacles, which present mere possibilities for action.51  
So, what is demand character? We can precisify it as the way the particular object, as presented 
in emotional experience, makes specific calls for action, as imperatives to action. Frijda speaks of the 
‘urgency of the action calls that targets emanate, the violence of their call as incentives, their 
 
50 See Deonna (2006: 29-46) for a similar view within the framework of the perceptual theory of emotion, 
such that we perceive calls for action. 
51 See Sartre 2004a [1936]; 2004b [1939]: 39, 59; Lewin 1938; Scheler 1973: 154-162; Lambie and Marcel 
2002: 238. See Nanay 2011: 305-22 for a contemporary development of these ideas. One might have a 
sparser view of the contents of perception which would deny that modal properties and imperatives (see 
the discussion of demand character below) are the sorts of properties that can be (simply) perceived (cf. 
Siegel 2010). Further to this, we need not take a stand here on questions concerning the ontological status 
of affordances or instrumental value properties (i.e. whether they are metaphysically objective properties of 
objects or in some sense subject-dependent) – the analysis is couched at the phenomenological level. 
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appearing irresistible, overpowering, unbidden, not to be lost track of’.52 In this sense, the relevant 
‘demands’ are experienced as demands made by the object of the experience, and so as primitively 
compelling – as demanding that something should or must be done with respect to itself. Marcel 
and Lambie label something similar ‘gerundival properties’, whereby the subject experiences the 
particular object as impelling that a specific action should or must be performed concerning itself.53 
Based on the above, we might say the following concerning an object-based interpretation of 
action-readiness. The phenomenology of felt action-readiness does not include any attendant 
bodily-attitudinal phenomenology. Instead, the phenomenology of felt action readiness amounts 
to experiencing particular objects as having the relevant demand characters, as ‘calling for…’, 
‘demanding…’, ‘obstructing…’, ‘requiring...’. As such, the phenomenology of action readiness admits 
of an interpretation which builds the relevant action-readiness into the content. It is the objects 
having the relevant demand character that captures how things are experientially for one in 
emotional experience qua action-readiness.  
Further to the above, in cases where there is a bodily phenomenology of action readiness, it is 
experienced as an effect of the objects having the relevant demand character. Consider the 
following example. Fred, stood at one of the lookout points on the Grand Canyon, is surveying a 
grand vista, and experiences awe. In line with the idea of action-ready demand character, the vista 
is experientially given as authoritatively calling for exploration. In such a case, Fred may experience 
an accompanying bodily phenomenology of a non-atomistic sort, say his body ‘opening up’ or 
being in an ‘explorative posture’. However, any such action-ready bodily phenomenology is 
 
52 Frijda 2007: 205. ‘Demand character’ so understood – as emotion-specific instrumental value properties 
– would explain why emotions give us reasons for action; their content includes action demands (e.g. an object 
presented as making a call for care gives us a motivating reason for caring actions). 
53 See Lambie and Marcel 2002: 329. Although they claim (contrary to Frijda) that such properties are not 
presented in first-order emotional experience. 
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experienced as, and is arguably intelligible as (makes sense as), an effect of the vista having the 
relevant demand character. 
Importantly, a defender of this object-side interpretation of action-readiness may agree that to 
account for the experience of any given emotion appeal must be made to a reactive or responsive 
dimension, as constitutive of the emotion (rather than merely an effect). To undergo an emotion 
is in some critical sense to be moved by something, in one way or another. They may also concede 
that merely representing the relevant demand character of the particular object is not per se to be 
moved in any emotionally relevant (affective) way. Nonetheless, the precise sense of ‘being 
moved’, as referring to the relevant affective response or attitudes, is not equivalent to putative 
felt action readiness ‘on the subject-side’. For example, the responsive dimension of standing in 
front of the vista and experiencing awe, such that one experiences the vista as authoritatively calling 
for exploration, might be given through affective attitudes that are not necessarily bodily, such as 
approval, or favour.54 In any case, the object-side interpretation of action-readiness is not a fully-
fledged theory of what emotions are, but a potential plank in some such theory, and one that seems 
to run against the grain of the bodily-attitudinal theory.55 
Building on this discussion is the following suggestion by Frijda concerning the bodily aspect 
of action readiness:  
 
When attentional focus moves from the world to oneself, experience changes accordingly. The 
objects now are aspects of my body, my states or my person…in self-focus, action readiness 
becomes articulate as felt urge – urge with a particular aim, such as for self-protection, or to 
broaden and build the scope of one’s interactions. Felt anger turns from seeing a bastardly 
 
54 See Poellner 2016: 1-28 and Mitchell (forthcoming) for one way of developing this kind of view.  
55 Note, in the logical space of theories of aspects of emotion, they are nonetheless still relatively close to 
one another. 
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offender into felt urge to strike him, to harm him and remove him from his field of action. 
(Frijda 2007: 205) 
 
This implies that we can better understand the bodily action readiness Deonna and Teroni 
highlight as a dimension of second-order attention to emotional experience, rather than part of its 
first-order phenomenology. Put otherwise, it is only in a switch of attention ‘from the world to 
oneself’ that we get the felt bodily attitudes of action readiness that the bodily-attitudinal theory 
claims constitute emotions. 56  
In sum, the question we have been trying to answer is as follows: is the felt action-readiness 
of emotional experience more faithfully described in terms of the object making a call on the 
subject to act (as a demand to act in a given way), or as the subject taking a bodily stance or attitude 
towards the object (as being prepared to act in a given way). This section has presented reasons to 
take the former view seriously, as a plausible, and phenomenologically preferable, alternative to 
the latter. In light of this, the bodily-attitudinal theory needs to do more to defend its interpretation 
of felt action-readiness 
 
3.2 Transformation and difference in content 
This section considers a final concern connected to action readiness, which is tied into theoretical 
issues concerning attitudes and contents, and shows how it creates problems for the bodily-
attitudinal theory. 
 
56 It should also be noted that in certain passages Frijda (2005: 482) suggests more generally that the 
intentionality of the emotion – that is its outward-directedness towards the world – breaks down when 
one switches from ‘the world’ to the experience’. This observation could be used (as Deonna and Teroni 
do; see 2015: 308) to make the point that emotional phenomenology is not simply that of something 
(some object) making itself manifest. I provide a detailed discussion of the relative transparency and 
opacity of emotional experience in separate work (see Mitchell 2020). 
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In the passage quoted from Frijda at the beginning of 3.1, he talks of the way action readiness 
transforms a ‘neutral world’. I now examine this modification claim. First, talk of a ‘neutral world’ 
in this context pertains to our experience of the world (or objects within it) being presented in a 
non-emotional way, or by way of non-emotional mental states. In this context, it still makes sense 
to think of the relevant particular objects as having hodological properties, as everyday 
instrumental value properties. Now consider the purported ‘transformation’: Frijda claims in 
world-directed joy our experience ‘shifts’ such that previously the particular object (in this case 
putatively ‘the world’, but it could be a more common-garden variety particular object), as given 
in hodological space, was experienced as merely open and available. More precisely, the content of 
the non-emotional experience can be (partly) specified in terms of the relevant hodological 
properties of being ‘open’ or ‘available’. When we move to world-directed joy, there is a ‘shift’. 
The world now becomes ‘within reach’ such that it calls-to-be-participated in. As such, the content of 
the emotional experience includes such properties or aspects approximating this demand character 
(e.g. demanding engagement).57   
 Now, if this account of the relevant differences in content concerning a putative 
‘transformation of a neutral world’ in joy – by way of felt action-readiness – is plausible then this 
creates a problem for the bodily-attitudinal theory. A central aspect of the theory is the claim that 
emotional experiences get their intentional content from their cognitive bases. Remember, 
emotions are claimed to be evaluative attitudes towards contents provided by other psychological 
states – they inherit the content they have from their cognitive bases. Moreover, this is supposed 
to be a benefit of the view since it preserves the idea – reflected in ordinary language about 
intentional experience and emotion – that (i) different emotion-types can be (note, not necessarily 
are) different attitudes towards the same content and (ii) different intentional states can have the 
 
57 Given this explication, Frijda’s ‘transformation of the world’ is not principally evaluative, in the sense of 
relating the presentation in emotional experience of relevant thick evaluative properties (cf. Goldie 2000: 
59-60). 
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same content as emotion. Call this the sameness of content claim.58 Note, one can accept that, in many 
cases, content is an important variable to explain why a subject ends up with one emotion rather 
than another (or no emotion). The relevant claim, therefore, is understood as saying that such a 
difference in content is not necessary to explain why subjects end up with one emotion rather than 
another (or no emotion), such that there are cases where the content is the same, and the attitudes 
differ. Nonetheless, because the view accepts this sameness of content claim, it cannot allow the object-
side interpretation of felt action readiness as given in terms of demand character. Doing so allows 
those kinds of ‘transformation of the world’ accounts to be given, where this arguably points to a 
difference in content. This conflict is now explained in detail.  
The bodily-attitudinal theory has to frame felt action readiness exclusively on the ‘subject side’ 
– in terms of supposed attendant bodily-attitudinal phenomenology – because if felt action 
readiness, as demand character, was allowed as a specific way the particular objects of emotional 
experience are presented, and so as an aspect of the content of emotional experience, then it is 
implausible that the sameness of content claim is ever true. As noted above in the discussion of the 
‘transformation of a neutral world’, the content of an emotional experience, as including demand 
character, is non-trivially different from any non-emotional state (even if there is overlapping 
content). Moreover, the demand character of particular emotional experiences – say fear compared 
to joy, or melancholy compared to regret – may be non-trivially different along the lines of demand 
character. 
Concerning the latter cases, consider the following as a prima facie plausible example in which 
the content is the same, but the emotional attitudes differ. Sally and Gill stand in conversation 
with Bill at a party. Sally is experiencing disgust at Bill, whereas Gill is experiencing admiration for 
him. Isn’t this a case of same content different attitude? Not if we think of the different emotions 
demand characters. Since on that picture, the shared object (Bill), will be experienced as having 
 
58 See Deonna and Teroni 2014: 26-7; 2012: 76-8.  
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different demand characters for the different emotions. Roughly, for Sally, Bill demands withdrawal-
from or escape-from, whereas, for Gill, Bill demands approach-to or engagement-with. If this is the case, 
then the different demand characters will be reflected in a difference in content across the different 
emotions.  
Against this, is it more plausible to insist that both emotions have the same content, but just 
focus on their object and its properties (Bill) in a different way, where this is cashed out exclusively 
in terms of different action-ready bodily attitudes with different attendant attitudinal 
phenomenologies (i.e. a different bodily way)? It is at least as plausible to claim that even in this 
case, the different emotions present the same object as having different demand characters. Note 
it will not suffice to reply that the content is the same simply because the cognitive base is the same  
(that both are based on the same perception) since that begs the question against the alternative 
we are considering – namely, putative differences in content along the lines of different demand 
character.  
One alternative response in such cases might be as follows: the phenomenology of any given 
emotion blends in such a way that makes for a unified whole, on the basis of which it is simply 
not possible to distinguish the phenomenology of attitude and that of content. Yet, such a response 
is arguably too concessive since it arguably necessitates giving up on talk of attendant attitudinal 
phenomenology (see 2.3). We might question what motivation we have for positing an attendant 
attitudinal phenomenology if in actual cases of emotional experience, we simply cannot distinguish 
the contribution of attitude vs content with respect to the phenomenology of the experience.   
In sum, given the sameness of content claim, the bodily-attitudinal theory cannot allow for content 
becoming a necessary variable between different emotions, and emotions and non-emotional 
states which target the same particular object. Yet the necessity of a difference in content along 
the lines of demand character – drawing on an object-side interpretation of action readiness – is a 
plausible account of part of what happens in cases of (a) moving from non-emotional to emotional 
experience with a shared object, and (b) the difference between different emotions directed 
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towards the same particular object. However, if that is the case, then the sameness of content claim 
looks questionable even if those cases which seem prima facie well suited to support it.   
Deonna and Teroni do respond to the objection that the attitude-content distinction does not 
apply to emotions.59 However, nothing in the above account of action-readiness, of demand 
character on the object-side, necessitates rejecting that distinction. That two experiential states 
which target the same particular object can differ in intentional content (in some non-trivial 
respect) does not mean that when considering a token experience, say a particular emotion, we 
cannot fruitfully distinguish those features of the experience best characterized as contentful vs 
those best characterized as attitudinal. 
What the above discussion points to is the related, but different issue, of whether it is plausible 
to insist that different emotions, and emotions and non-emotional states, directed toward the same 
particular object, could share the same content qua demand character. This way of framing the 
issue has the benefit that it need not reject the attitude-content distinction for token intentional 
experiences and does not claim that the respect in which content is a necessary variable across 
emotion-types and relevant non-emotional states (as directed towards the same particular object) 
concerns the representation of thick evaluative properties – which the bodily-attitudinal theory 
rejects. It instead proceeds from a feature of emotional experience, action-readiness, that is agreed 
to be central to emotional phenomenology, and offers an alternative interpretation of it which is 
incompatible, or at least in tension with, a claim of the bodily-attitudinal theory. 
Of course, the bodily-attitudinal theory may reject the object-side interpretation of felt action 
readiness, and related ideas of ‘transformation’ and different demand character as pointing to a 
necessary difference in content. However, in doing so, the view needs to explain what is 
problematic about this interpretation; one cannot do this by claiming that we also need to build in 
action readiness on the subject-side. Given the above, the bodily-attitudinal theory cannot, by its 
 
59 Deonna and Teroni 2015: 304-7. 
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strictures, tolerate any necessary variability on the object-side since this will undermine the sameness 
of content claim. Further to this, what will also not do is insisting that the object-side interpretation 
of action readiness (and what follows from it) must be wrong given the strictures of the view 
concerning the sameness of content claim. That would beg the question against the alternative, which 
intuitively points to explanatorily significant differences in the relevant contents. What is required 
is a substantive response to this alternative interpretation of felt action-readiness or a qualification 
of the relevant claims concerning the content of emotional experience. Failing that, the strategy of 
building all of the distinctiveness of emotional experience into the (bodily)attitudinal side looks 
questionable. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has critically assessed the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion, according to which 
emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action-readiness. After reconstructing the view, two detailed 
objections were considered. Finally, an alternative interpretation of felt action-readiness was 
provided. This also served as a positive proposal concerning how to theorize the phenomenology 
of action-readiness in emotional experience, which arguably better respects the relevant 
phenomenology and can deal more neatly with theoretical issues concerning differences in content. 
So, while the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion is a distinctive and philosophically substantial 
proposal concerning the question of what emotions are, which should be taken seriously, there 
remain problems and issues which need addressing. Defenders of the view should meet the 
challenges set out here if they wish to preserve the theory. 
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